Imagine a group of international minds huddled together, sketching out the blueprint for a war-torn region's rebirth—without a single blueprint from history to guide them. That's the bold reality unfolding in Gaza today, where uncertainty meets unprecedented ambition. But here's where it gets controversial: could this multinational force truly transform the Strip, or is it just another illusion of peace in a powder keg? Stick around, because most people miss the intricate dance of diplomacy and danger at play here.
In a world lacking any comparable international experiment, drawing sobering lessons from the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon, a blend of cautious hope and measured skepticism fuels the daily gatherings. Six dedicated steering and think-tank teams convene each morning on the top floor of the U.S. Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC)—a hub for blending civilian oversight with military strategy—located in an industrial zone near Kiryat Gat. Representatives from 21 nations collaborate intensely, striving to redefine Gaza's future landscape. Their enthusiasm is palpable, yet they all anticipate a pivotal decision originating far from this Israeli site. And this is the part most people miss: if this ambitious plan falters or stalls, Hamas stands to emerge as the clear victor, potentially prolonging instability and suffering.
The IDF estimates that within weeks to a few months, the United States will make the call on deploying this multinational force—a critical linchpin without which the second phase of the ceasefire deal with Hamas cannot advance. As U.N. legal experts engage in discussions with counterparts from the U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) about the force's precise authority, the six working groups in Kiryat Gat are already laying the groundwork for swift deployment. They meticulously outline the force's arsenal, operational zones, rules of engagement to avoid clashes with IDF troops, and specialized communication tools for incoming foreign soldiers in Gaza.
Even the force's name remains under debate in these headquarters, alongside uniform designs for troops who will take over high-stakes duties from IDF soldiers. These tasks include the risky work of uncovering and demolishing the extensive network of Hamas terror tunnels, as well as seizing over 20,000 weapons from the group—whether through negotiation or force. For beginners, think of these tunnels as hidden underground highways that terrorists use for ambushes and smuggling, built with concrete and steel that could otherwise help rebuild homes.
Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth have uncovered that, despite various media reports suggesting otherwise, this multinational force—if it materializes and Muslim-majority countries agree to contribute troops—will operate directly within Gaza's borders, not on Israeli territory. The Israeli defense establishment firmly advocates for this arrangement to ensure close oversight, though the final say could shift if participating nations prioritize their soldiers' safety too highly.
Just last week, the Americans chose to spotlight the command center's operations to the press, aiming to build positive buzz and translate theoretical plans into tangible action. Amidst this, dozens of staff members from nations like Egypt, the UAE, the UK, and New Zealand are energized by UN Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted recently to pave the way for Gaza's new governance devoid of Hamas control.
Notably absent from the headquarters are representatives from the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, or Qatar. Yet, their influence permeates every conversation: substantial funding, key support, and sway over reconstruction efforts are expected from Ankara and Doha, the capitals instrumental in brokering the war's end. The IDF repeatedly cautions about Turkey and Qatar's roles, given their ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, the same movement affiliated with Hamas.
Small-scale coordination efforts are already yielding results, even without formal liaison officers. For instance, when Hamas operatives, including armed individuals, cross into IDF territory every few days to hunt for hostages, the IDF refrains from engaging them, thanks to on-the-ground tactical agreements.
'Everything is starting to flow more smoothly,' remarked an IDF official. 'Just two years ago, we had to convince the global community and the U.S. of Hamas's dominance over humanitarian aid through convoluted incidents. Now, Americans are embedded in the humanitarian command center relocated here from the Al-Taymūm base in Jordan, witnessing it firsthand daily.'
This shift underscores what remains unchanged: Hamas continues to receive vast quantities—thousands of tons—of food, fuel, gas, and medicine via the 600 trucks Israel permits into Gaza each day, allowing the group to maintain control and operate on a week-by-week basis.
Among the most fascinating teams is the Intelligence Group, where Israeli military intelligence briefs foreign officers daily to equip the multinational force for real-world operations. These sessions demystify Hamas's inner workings: the layout of tunnels viewed from within, repair timelines post-bombing, platoon and company structures, weaponry preferences, and guerrilla tactics mixed with anti-tank and sniper attacks—tactics the group has ramped up against IDF forces in recent months. For those new to this, imagine Hamas as a shadowy militia that combines hit-and-run raids with advanced weaponry, much like insurgents in other conflicts.
The objective is straightforward: ensure the force, trained at dedicated bases in Jordan and Egypt alongside parallel-trained Palestinian police, isn't caught off guard in its initial confrontations with terrorists.
'There's no parallel multinational force anywhere globally. We scoured for lessons, emphasizing what to avoid,' explained an IDF spokesperson.
Take the UNIFIL force in Sudan as an example—it's armed but often retreats when fired upon. In many ways, the Gaza force could be a groundbreaking model, the world's first of its kind.
The task of actually assembling this force falls to CENTCOM's special operations unit, suggesting its troops won't mirror the laid-back Filipino or Italian observers in UNDOF on the Golan Heights or UNIFIL in Lebanon. UNIFIL, in fact, comes up frequently in discussions—and not favorably. From the IDF's viewpoint, this long-standing force maintaining calm in southern Lebanon since the late 1970s represents everything to steer clear of in Gaza. UNIFIL's failures, particularly in the last couple of years—where Hezbollah intimidated blue-helmeted peacekeepers into avoiding Hezbollah's buildup near Galilee—are studied here as cautionary tales. The IDF insists that in places like Khan Younis or Deir al-Balah, such timidity won't be tolerated.
Trust is gradually forming within the command center. When Nahal Brigade units enter areas like Bait Hanoun or Jabaliya to dismantle fresh tunnels on Israel's side of the Yellow Line, updates go first to American officers for ceasefire compliance checks. Similarly, Golani Brigade operations near Rafah, targeting entrenched terrorists in underground hideouts—some of whom surrendered or perished trying to escape recently—are live-streamed via drones to Kiryat Gat participants, fostering mutual confidence.
The most dynamic group handles humanitarian affairs. The U.S. has recently claimed responsibility for Gaza aid, but Israel retains practical control within the same team. IDF inspectors vet trucks at border crossings, and Israeli officials decide on contentious issues, like the ongoing embargo on dual-use materials such as concrete and steel—vital for rebuilding destroyed homes but risky for tunnel construction.
This scenario perfectly illustrates the public relations spin, especially for Israeli audiences: Israel delivers the aid funneling to Hamas, yet the U.S. gets portrayed as the accountable party. If America and Trump take the helm in Gaza, the thinking goes, they'll shoulder the blame—supposedly ensuring Hamas's defeat and tranquility for Negev residents. But here's where it gets controversial: is this a fair burden-shifting, or a clever way to maintain Israeli leverage while appearing to hand over control?
Meanwhile, another team is conceptualizing blueprints for fresh Palestinian communities in Gaza. With around two million residents facing homelessness—most homes obliterated or severely damaged by IDF strikes during the conflict— these plans address basics like electricity connections. For instance, will new neighborhoods in Beit Hanoun draw power from a nearby Israeli grid near Sderot, or from Gaza's southern line fed by Egypt? Foreign experts also ponder water pipelines, fuel networks, and a monumental cleanup task reminiscent of post-World War II efforts, though on a regional scale: clearing mountains of debris from two years of warfare. Estimates point to thousands to tens of thousands of tons of rubble, pulverized from neighborhoods in eastern Khan Younis, Rafah, Shuja’iya, and Beit Hanoun.
Then there's the forward-looking team contemplating Gaza's education system. What curricula will schools and kindergartens adopt? They even envision training mosque imams to curb future incitement via loudspeakers. This group accounts for demographic growth: Gaza's population will swell by roughly 50,000 Palestinians annually.
Already, about 150 IDF soldiers are integrated into this international framework under U.S. command, protecting Israel's security interests across discussions. The initiative includes IDF-appointed operations officers, a brigadier-general, and a two-star general, some of whom express optimism.
For example, Italians and Brits show keen interest in tunnel demolition techniques, drawing from global NATO experience with explosives. Australians contribute too, while Hungarians and Danes emphasize humanitarian logistics.
The dominant perspective in Israel's defense circles envisions Gaza's future with local Palestinian administration under global supervision, temporary international assistance that might linger indefinitely.
As we wrap this up, let's ponder some tough questions: Do you believe a multinational force can genuinely disarm Hamas without repeating past peacekeeping blunders like UNIFIL? Should Muslim-majority nations participate, risking their troops in Gaza—or is that a recipe for unintended escalation? And who truly controls the aid flow: Israel, the U.S., or a shadowy alliance? Share your thoughts in the comments—do you see this as a pathway to peace, or just another diplomatic mirage?
